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Abstract
We analyze a secure dual-hop mixed radio frequency-free space optical (RF-FSO) downlink si-
multaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) systems. The FSO link and all RF links
experience Gamma-Gamma, independent and identical Nakagami-m fading, respectively. We analyze the
effects of atmospheric turbulence, pointing error, detection technology, path loss, and energy harvesting
on secrecy performance. Signal-to-noise ratios at both legitimate and illegitimate receivers are not
independent since they are both simultaneously influenced by the FSO link. We derive the closed-
form expression of the secrecy outage probability (SOP) as well as the asymptotic result for SOP
when signal-to-noise ratios at relay and legitimate destinations tend to infinity. Monte-Carlo simulations
are performed to verify the accuracy of our analysis. The results show that the secrecy diversity order
(SDO) depends on the fading parameter of the relay-destination link and the number of the destination’s
antennas. Additionally, the SDO also depends on the fading parameters, the pointing error parameter,
and the detection type of the FSO link.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, mixed RF-FSO systems, Gamma-Gamma fading, Nakagami-m fading,
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer, secrecy outage probability.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Related Works
Dual-hop mixed radio frequency-free space optical (RF-FSO) systems are designed to over-
come atmospheric turbulence and other factors limiting the applications of FSO systems. They
can also effectively improve communication coverage, save spectrum resources, avoid relocating
devices, and are considered as a powerful candidate for next generation of wireless communica-
tions [1], [2], [3]. In a typical mixed RF-FSO system, users’ signals are transmitted to the base
station (which serves as a relay node) via the RF link, converted to optical signals, multiplexed,
and transmitted to the data center via the FSO link. We called this “uplink (UL) scenarios”. On
the contrary, in “downlink (DL) scenarios”, messages sent from the data center are delivered to
the base station/relay through the FSO link, converted to a wireless signal and then sent to the
user. Assuming a message sent by the data center is only for specific users, the remaining users
within the coverage of the relay node are potential eavesdroppers.
It has been verified that physical layer security (PLS) technology can prevent illegitimate
receivers from eavesdropping due to the time-varying nature of the wireless medium [4]-[8].
Numerical studies of PLS over FSO satellite ground systems were performed by Endo et al. [9].
They showed that secrecy communications were possible and that there can be a complementary
technologies to balance security and usability issues. But in their study, Endo et al. only
considered some idealistic conditions and assumed that the channels were fading-free. Lopez-
Martinez et al. [10] studied PLS based on Wyner’s FSO model and used the probability of
strict secrecy capacity to evaluate the secrecy performance. But they considered only two special
cases: when the eavesdropper is either near the source or the destination. Sun and Djordievic [11]
studied a secure orbital angular momentum multiplexing FSO system and numerically simulated
its secrecy capacity. Their results showed that secrecy performance depends on the location of
eavesdroppers and that orbital angular momentum multiplexing technology could improve the
secrecy in weak and medium turbulence regimes.
The FSO link is viewed to be highly secure since the laser beam has high directionality [12]-
[15]. However, the broadcast nature of the RF link makes the mixed RF-FSO systems vulnerable
to wiretap. Recently, the PLS of mixed RF-FSO systems stimulated researchers’ interest and quite
a few studies on this topic were reported in the literature, including [12]-[15]. El-Malek et al.
[12] studied the security reliability trade-off of a single-input multiple-output mixed RF-FSO
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3system and derived the closed-form expressions for some generalized performance metrics, such
as outage probability (OP), intercept probability (IP), etc. The same authors also analyzed the
effect of RF co-channel interference on the secrecy performance of mixed RF-FSO systems and
proposed a new power allocation scheme to enhance the secrecy performance [13]. Notice that
the all the performance metrics studied in [12] and [13] were considered the main channel or
wiretap channel separately. By contrast, the secrecy outage probability (SOP) investigated in our
work is considered the main channel and wiretap channel simultaneously. We studied the secrecy
performance of a UL mixed RF-FSO system with perfect and imperfect channel state information
in [14] and [15], respectively. The closed-formed expressions for the exact and asymptotic SOP
were derived. Our results demonstrated that the turbulence degrades the secrecy performance
and that it is difficult to wiretap when the intensity modulation with direct detection (IM/DD)
technology is replaced by the heterodyne detection (HD) technology. Furthermore, the secrecy
outage performance of a UL mixed RF-FSO system with was investigated in
It is noteworthy that [12]-[15] considered the UL mixed RF-FSO transmission systems, in
which the FSO link only influences the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at legitimate receivers.
Technically speaking, it is much more challenging to analyze the secrecy performance for DL
mixed RF-FSO transmission systems compared to analyze the OP/IP/SOP for UL mixed RF-
FSO transmission systems. This is because the problem in DL mixed RF-FSO systems becomes
complex where all RF destinations are affected by the FSO link.
It is expected that the next generation of wireless communications will comprise a lot of
simpler and cheaper wireless nodes which are powered by batteries. For these nodes, it is quite
difficult or even impossible to replace the batteries. Then the simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) technology was proposed to solve this problem [16]-[20]. Since
part of energy is used to charge the battery at receivers, the power for information delivery will
decrease, which will lead to the degraded secrecy capacity [21]. Thus many literature recently
focused on the security of SWIPT systems [22]-[26]. The security for SWIPT systems was first
considered in [22] and the resource allocation design for secure MISO SWIPT systems was
formulated as a non-convex optimization problem and an efficient resource allocation algorithm
was proposed to obtain the global optimal solution. The secrecy performance of SIMO and
MISO SWIPT systems were investigated and the closed-form expressions for SOP were derived
in [23] and [24], respectively. The secrecy outage performance of an underlay multiple-input-
multiple-output cognitive radio networks with energy harvesting and transmit antenna selection
June 7, 2018 DRAFT
4was studied in [25]. And all these works just considered the RF systems. Pan et al. investigated
the secrecy performance of a hybrid visible light communication (VLC)-RF system with light
energy harvesting and derived analytical expressions for exact and asymptotic SOP in [26].
Makki et al. analyzed the throughput and OP for the hybrid RF-FSO SWIPT systems and
a power allocation scheme was proposed in [27]. But all these works considered the hybrid
systems, in which the FSO/VLC and RF links were parallel and backup/backhaul. In our work,
a dual-hop mixed RF-FSO system is considered. It is assumed that SWIPT is used to collect
energy for all RF receivers from the wireless signals sent by the relay node.
B. Motivation and Contributions
To our best knowledge, there is no literature studying the physical layer security of DL mixed
RF-FSO SWIPT systems. In this work, we study a secure DL mixed RF-FSO system and analyze
the effects of misalignment, different detection schemes, SWIPT, and multiple antenna techniques
on secrecy performance of mixed systems. In summary:
• We study the secrecy outage performance of the DL mixed RF-FSO SWIPT systems over
Gamma-Gamma - Nakagami-m fading channels with DF relaying schemes. We investigate
the effects of misalignment, different detection schemes, SWIPT, and multiple antenna
techniques and deduct the closed-form expressions for the exact and asymptotic SOPs.
• We present a selected figures illustrating Monte-Carlo simulations and analytic results in
order to validate our analysis. Results show that the HD detection method can lead to lower
secrecy outage compared to IM/DD, and that the SOP can also be improved with less
pointing error or/and weak turbulence. The path-loss degrades the security of the DL mixed
RF-FSO systems when the FSO link is the bottleneck of the transmission, and vice versa.
Moreover, our results show that the secrecy diversity order (SDO) is determined by the
fading parameter of the relay-destination link and the number of the destination’s antennas.
Additionally, the SDO also depends on the fading parameters, the pointing error parameter,
and the detection type of the FSO link.
• The correlation of the SNR at legitimate and illegitimate receivers is considered and is
eliminated by using the law of total probability. The results in our work does not only
apply to the mixed RF-FSO systems but also can be utilized to investigate the secrecy
performance of all the dual-hop cooperative systems with DF scheme when there is not
direct link between the source and the receiver.
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5• Differing from [12]-[15], the DL mixed RF-FSO systems were studied in this work, in
which both SNRs at legitimate and illegitimate destinations are influenced by the FSO link.
• Although the secrecy performance of DL mixed RF-FSO systems was investigated in [28],
the correlation of the SNR at both legitimate and illegitimate receivers was not considered.
Furthermore, SWIPT, path-loss fading, and multiple antennas are considered in this work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the system model. The
exact SOP analysis is presented in Section III, while Section IV analyzes the asymptotic SOP.
Simulation results are given in Section V, while Section VI concludes this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
We consider a DL mixed RF-FSO SWIPT system (shown in Fig. 1), with confidential signals
transmitted from the data center (S) to the legitimate destination node (D) through the relay
(R). There is an eavesdropper E who is attempting to wiretap the information, and D and E are
equipped with ND (ND ≥ 1) and NE (NE ≥ 1) antennas, respectively. We assume that the FSO
link follows a unified Gamma-Gamma fading and that all the RF links experience independent
and identical Nakagami-m fading. The maximum ratio combining (MRC) scheme is utilized at
both D and E to improve the received SNR.
All the receivers (both D and E) are equipped with a rechargeable battery harvesting the RF
energy broadcasted from R, and power splitting (PS) method is used to coordinate the processes
of information decoding and energy harvesting from the received signal [16], [23], [24]. This
means that the received signal is divided into information decoding (ID) part and harvesting
energy (EH) part. In other words, the αj (0 ≤ αj ≤ 1, j ∈ {D,E}) portion of the signal power is
used to decode information, and the remaining portion of power is used for harvesting the energy.
The linear EH model is not practical since an EH circuit usually comprises diodes, inductors and
capacitors. The new non-linear EH model was proposed in [29] and [30], respectively. Actually,
the EH model does not influence the secrecy performance of the mixed RF-FSO system because
the different EH model just influence the energy harvested at the receivers (D and E) and does
not influence the SNR at the receivers. Only the portion of signal power used to ID influences
the SNR at receivers. The situation is similar to the case with the infinity capacity EH buffer
and finite capacity EH buffer scenarios. Our results are also fit to the case with time splitting
method. It should be noted that the splitting factors in our work are assumed to be fixed. The
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6secrecy performance might be affected with the splitting factors which are dynamically varying
depending on the non-linear EH model, which will be addressed in our future work.
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Fig. 1. System model of a DL mixed RF-FSO SWIPT system which consists of the data center (S), the relay (R), the legitimate
destination (D), and the eavesdropper (E). Both D and E are equipped with multiple antennas.
The probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γSR
can be expressed as [31]
fγSR (γ) = Aγ
−1G3,01,3
[
Bγ
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] , (1)
FγSR (γ) = IG
3r,1
r+1,3r+1
[
ργ
∣∣∣1,K1K2,0] , (2)
respectively, where A = ξ
2
rΓ(a)Γ(b)
, B = habr√ΩSR , I =
ξ2ra+b−2
(2pi)r−1Γ(a)Γ(b)
. a and b are the fading
parameters, r represents the detection scheme used at R, i.e. r = 1 for HD and r = 2 for IM/DD,
ξ is the pointing error at the destination [32]. ρ = (hab)
r
ΩSRr2r
, ΩSR represents the electrical SNR of the
FSO link, K1 = ∆(r, ξ
2 + 1), K2 = [∆ (r, ξ
2) ,∆(r, a) ,∆(r, b)], ∆(k, a) = a
k
, a+1
k
, · · · , a+k−1
k
,
h = ξ
2
ξ2+1
, and Gm,np,q [·] is Meijer’s G-function, as defined by (9.301) of [33].
The effects of path-loss and small-scale fading of the RF link are considered and the received
signals at the mth (1 ≤ m ≤ ND) antennas of D are expressed as
yD,m =
√
αD
(√
PtLcd
−η
D hRDmx+ nD,m
)
+ zD,m, (3)
where Pt is the transmit power at R, Lc is the propagation loss constant, dD is the distance
between R and D, η is the path-loss exponent (η = 0 means that the effect of path loss is
ignored), x denotes the transmitted symbol from R, hRDm is the channel coefficient, nD,m and
zD,m represent the additive white Gaussian noise and the signal processing noise at the mth
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7antenna of D, which are additive white Gaussian noise with zero means and variances N0 and
σ2D, respectively.
The SNR of the signal at D is then written as
γRD =
αDPtLc
ND∑
m=1
HRDm
d
η
D (αDN0 + σ
2
D)
, (4)
where HRDm = |hRDm |2.
Using Lemma 1 of [34], we obtain the PDF and CDF for the received SNR on D as
fγRD (γ) =
λτDD
Γ (τD)
γτD−1e−λDγ, (5)
FγRD (γ) = 1− e−λDγ
τD−1∑
p=0
λ
p
D
p!
γp, (6)
respectively, where λD =
mDd
η
D(αDN0+σ2D)
ΩRDαDPtLc
, ΩRD is the expectation of HRDm , τD = mDND, and
Γ (·) is the Gamma function, as defined by eq. (8.310) of [33].
Similarly, we obtain the PDF and CDF of γRE as
fγRE (γ) =
λτEE
Γ (τE)
γτE−1e−λEγ, (7)
FγRE (γ) = 1− e−λEγ
τE−1∑
n=0
λnE
n!
γn, (8)
respectively, where λE =
mEd
η
E(αEN0+σ2E)
ΩREαEPtLc
, ΩRE is the average power channel gains between R
and E, and τE = mENE .
We assume that decode-and-forward (DF) relaying scheme is used at R. The equivalent SNRs
at D and E are then expressed as 1
γeq,D = min (γSR, γRD) (9)
γeq,E = min (γSR, γRE) , (10)
respectively.
1The results are also fit to the bound of variable gain amplify-and-forward relaying scheme, as testified in many literature,
such as [14], [32], [35].
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8III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
As defined in [36], we obtain the secrecy capacity of DF relaying scheme as
Cs = max {Ceq,D − Ceq,E, 0}
= max {ln (1 + min (γSR, γRD))− ln (1 + min (γSR, γRE)) , 0}
=


max {ln (1 + γSR)− ln (1 + γSR) , 0} , γSR ≤ min (γRD, γRE)
max {ln (1 + γRD)− ln (1 + γRE) , 0} , γSR ≥ max (γRD, γRE)
max {ln (1 + γSR)− ln (1 + γRE) , 0} , γRE ≤ γSR ≤ γRD
max {ln (1 + γRD)− ln (1 + γSR) , 0} , γRD ≤ γSR ≤ γRE
=


ln (1 + γRD)− ln (1 + γRE) , γRE ≤ γRD ≤ γSR
ln (1 + γSR)− ln (1 + γRE) , γRE ≤ γSR ≤ γRD
0, otherwise
(11)
Remark 1: From (11), one can easily find that when γRE < γSR, the secrecy capacity of
mixed RF-FSO systems with DF scheme can be rewritten as
Cs = max {ln (1 + min (γSR, γRD))− ln (1 + γRE) , 0} . (12)
Eq. (12) means that the R−E link is the bottleneck for the equivalent SNR at E. This equation
is easy to understand but very useful since the two parts in (12) are independent. It should be
noted that the secrecy capacity in this case (when γRE < γSR) may be equal to zero.
Remark 2: On the other side, when γRE > γSR, which means S-R link is the bottleneck for
the equivalent SNR at E, the secrecy capacity in this case must be zero because the equivalent
SNR at D cannot be greater than the one at R, which can be expressed as
min (γSR, γRD) ≤ min (γSR, γRE) = γSR. (13)
Thus SOP can be expressed as
Pout = Pr {Cs ≤ Rs}
= H1 +H2 + 1− ̺,
(14)
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9where Rs represents the target secrecy rate, H1, H2, and ̺ are expressed as
H1 = Pr {ln (1 + γRD)− ln (1 + γRE) < Rs, γRE ≤ γRD ≤ γSR} (15)
H2 = Pr {ln (1 + γSR)− ln (1 + γRE) ≤ Rs, γRE ≤ γSR ≤ γRD} (16)
̺ = Pr {γRE ≤ γRD ≤ γSR}+ Pr {γRE ≤ γSR ≤ γRD}
= Pr {γRE ≤ γeq,D = min (γRD, γSR)} .
(17)
Remark 3: Based on (15) and (16), one can easily find that H1 and H2 means that the
bottleneck of equivalent SNR at D is R − D and S − R link, respectively. The corresponding
secrecy capacity in these two cases is positive but less than Rs, which cause the secrecy outage.
Remark 4: Moreover, one can find that (17) has no relationship with Rs. Because of γeq,E =
min (γSR, γRE) ≤ γRE , based on (17), we can observe that ̺ denotes the probability of γeq,E ≤
γeq,D. Then 1−̺ signifies the probability for Cs = 0 since the secrecy capacity of mixed RF-FSO
systems equals zero when γeq,E > γeq,D.
We can easily obtain another useful secrecy metric, probability of strictly positive secrecy
capacity [37], [38], as
P0 = ̺− (H1 +H2) |Rs=0 . (18)
It should also note that the previous results (Eqs. (11)- (17), Remark 1 - 4) does not only apply
to the mixed RF-FSO systems but also can be utilized to investigate the secrecy performance of
all the dual-hop cooperative systems with DF scheme when there is not direct link between the
source and the receiver.
In the following, we derive the closed-form expressions of (15)-(17).
A. Derivations of H1
We can rewrite H1 as
H1 = Pr
{
γRE >
γRD + 1−Θ
Θ
, γRE ≤ γRD ≤ γSR
}
, (19)
where Θ = eRs ≥ 1.
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Since γRD+1−Θ
Θ
≤ γRD, H1 can be rewritten as
H1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ x
0
φ1 (y) fγRD (y)dyfγSR (x) dx
=
∫ Θ−1
0
∫ x
0
FγRE (y) fγRD (y) dyfγSR (x) dx
+
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ x
0
φ2 (y) fγRD (y)dyfγSR (x) dx
= H11 +H12 +H13,
(20)
where
H11 =
∫ Θ−1
0
∫ x
0
FγRE (y) fγRD (y) dyfγSR (x) dx,
H12 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) fγRD (y) dyfγSR (x) dx,
H13 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ x
Θ−1
φ3 (y) fγRD (y)dyfγSR (x) dx,
φ1 (y) = Pr
{
y + 1−Θ
Θ
< γRE < y
}
,
φ2 (y) = FγRE (y)− FγRE
(
max
{
0,
y + 1−Θ
Θ
})
,
φ3 (y) = FγRE (y)− FγRE
(
y + 1−Θ
Θ
)
.
By substituting (1), (5) and (8) into H11, we obtain
H11 =
G0 (τD, λD)
Γ (τD)
− λ
τD
D
Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
λnEG0 (τD + n, λD + λE)
n!(λD + λE)
τD+n
, (21)
where G0 (α, β) =
∫ Θ−1
0
Υ (α, βx) fγSR (x) dx and Υ (·, ·) is the lower incomplete Gamma
function, defined by (8.350.1) of [33]. The closed-form expression of G0 (α, β) is given in
Appendix A.
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By substituting (1), (5) and (8) into H12 and using (3.351.1) of [33], we obtain
H12 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) fγRD (y) dyfγSR (x) dx
=
∫ ∞
Θ−1
fγSR (x) dx
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) fγRD (y)dy
= (1− FγSR (Θ− 1))
(∫ Θ−1
0
fγRD (y)dy −
τE−1∑
n=0
λE
n
n!
∫ Θ−1
0
yne−λEyfγRD (y) dy
)
= (1− FγSR (Θ− 1))
(
FγRD (Θ− 1)−
λτDD
Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
λE
nΥ (τD + n, (λD + λE) (Θ− 1))
n!(λD + λE)
τD+n
)
.
(22)
Using of (1.111) and (3.351.1) of [33], we have H13 as
H13 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ x
Θ−1
φ3 (y) fγRD (y) dyfγSR (x) dx
=
λτDD e
−λE(1−Θ)
Θ
Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
n∑
t=0
λnE(1−Θ)n−tH131
t! (n− t)!Θn
(
λD +
λE
Θ
)−τD−t
− λ
τD
D
Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
λnEH132
n!(λD + λE)
τD+n
,
(23)
where H131 = G2
(
τD + t,
(
λD +
λE
Θ
)) − Υ (τD + t, (λD + λEΘ ) (Θ− 1)) (1− FγSR (Θ− 1)),
H132 = G2 (τD + n, (λD + λE))−Υ (τD + n, (λD + λE) (Θ− 1)) (1− FγSR (Θ− 1)), and G2 (α, β) =
A
∫∞
Θ−1 x
−1Υ (α, βx)G3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx. The closed-form expression of G2 (α, β) is given in
Appendix B.
B. Derivations of H2
Similar to the derivation of H1, we have
H2 = H21 +H22 +H23, (24)
whereH21 =
∫ Θ−1
0
∫ x
0
FγRE (y) fγSR (y)dyfγRD (x) dx,H22 =
∫∞
Θ−1
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) fγSR (y) dyfγRD (x) dx,
and H23 =
∫∞
Θ−1
∫ x
Θ−1 φ3 (y) fγSR (y) dyfγRD (x) dx.
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Substituting (1), (5) and (8) into H21 and using (07.34.21.0084.01) of [39], we can achieve
H21 =
∫ Θ−1
0
∫ x
0
FγRE (y) fγSR (y) dyfγRD (x) dx
=
IλτDD
Γ (τD)
∫ Θ−1
0
xα−1e−βxG3r,1r+1,3r+1
[
ρx
∣∣∣1,K1K2,0] dx
− Aλ
τD
D
Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
λnE
n!
∫ Θ−1
0
∫ x
0
yn−1e−λEyG3,01,3
[
By
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] xτD−1e−λDxdydx
=
I
Γ (τD)
∞∑
s=0
(−1)sλυ1D (Θ− 1)υ1
s!
G
3r,2
r+2,3r+2
[
ρ (Θ− 1)
∣∣∣1−υ1,1,K1K2,0,−υ1 ]
− AΞ
Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
∞∑
s=0
∞∑
t=0
(−1)s+tλτD+tD λn+sE (Θ− 1)υ2
n!s!t!
G
3r,2
r+2,3r+2
[
Br (Θ− 1)
r2r
∣∣∣1−n−s,1−υ2,K1K2,−υ2,−n−s
]
(25)
where υ1 = τD + s and υ2 = τD + n + s+ t.
Similarly, using of (2.24.2.1) of [40] leads to the following expression for H22 as
H22 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) fγSR (y) dyfγRD (x) dx
=
∫ ∞
Θ−1
fγRD (x) dx
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) fγSR (y)dy
= (1− FγRD (Θ− 1))
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) fγSR (y) dy
= (1− FγRD (Θ− 1))
(
FγSR (Θ− 1)−A
τE−1∑
n=0
λnEG1 (n, λE)
n!
)
(26)
where G1 (z1, z2) is given by (49) in Appendix A.
After exchanging the order of the integral, we can rewrite H23 as
H23 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ x
Θ−1
φ3 (y) fγSR (y) dyfγRD (x) dx
=
∫ ∞
Θ−1
φ3 (y) fγSR (y)
∫ ∞
y
fγRD (x) dxdy
=
∫ ∞
Θ−1
φ3 (y) fγSR (y) (1− FγRD (y)) dy.
(27)
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By substituting (1), (5), and (8) into (27), we obtain
H23 = e
−λE( 1−ΘΘ )
τD−1∑
p=0
τE−1∑
n=0
n∑
t=0
(1−Θ)n−tλpDλnE
p!t! (n− t)!Θn G3
(
p+ t− 1, λD + λE
Θ
)
−
τD−1∑
p=0
τE−1∑
n=0
λ
p
Dλ
n
E
p!n!
G3 (p+ n− 1, λD + λE),
(28)
where G3 (α, β) = A
∫∞
Θ−1 y
αe−βyG3,01,3
[
By
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dy. With a similar method to G2 (α, β)
(defined in Appendix B), we obtain the closed-form expression of G3 (α, β) as
G3 (α, β) =
AΞ
βα+1
G
3r,1
r+1,3r
[
Br
r2rβ
∣∣∣−α,K1K2
]
−AG1 (α + 1, β) .
(29)
C. Derivation of ̺
The PDF of γeq,D can be expressed as [41]:
Fγeq,D (γ) = 1− e−λDγ
τD−1∑
p=0
λ
p
D
p!
γp + Ie−λDγG3r,1r+1,3r+1
[
ργ
∣∣∣1,K1K2,0]
τD−1∑
p=0
λ
p
D
p!
γp. (30)
When considering (7) and (30) and using (3.326.2) of [33], (11), (21) of [42], we obtain
̺ = Pr {γRE ≤ γeq,D}
= 1−EγRE [Pr {γeq,D ≤ γRE |γRE }]
=
λτEE
Γ (τE)
τD−1∑
p=0
λ
p
D
p!
∫ ∞
0
xτE+p−1e−(λD+λE)xdx
− Iλ
τE
E
Γ (τE)
τD−1∑
p=0
λ
p
D
p!
∫ ∞
0
xτE+p−1e−(λD+λE)xG3r,1r+1,3r+1
[
ρx
∣∣∣1,K1K2,0] dx
=
λτEE
Γ (τE)
τD−1∑
p=0
λ
p
D
(λD + λE)
τE+pp!
×
(
Γ (τE + p)− IG3r,2r+2,3r+1
[
ρ
λD + λE
∣∣∣1,1−(τE+p),K1K2,0
])
.
(31)
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic SOP in high-SNR region. We assume that ΩSR =
ϕΩRD, where ϕ is a constant and ΩRD →∞.
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The asymptotic CDF and PDF of γRD can be given by [34]
F∞γRD (γ) =
φτDD
ΩτDRDτD!
γτD , (32)
f∞γRD (γ) =
φτDD
ΩτDRDΓ (τD)
γτD−1, (33)
respectively, where φD =
mDd
η
D(αDN0+σ2D)
αDPtLc
.
The asymptotic CDF and PDF of γSR can be obtained by [31], [41]
F∞γSR (γ) = I
3r∑
k=1
χk
K2,kΩ
K2,k
RD
γK2,k , (34)
f∞γSR (γ) = I
3r∑
k=1
χk
Ω
K2,k
RD
γK2,k−1, (35)
respectively, where χk =
(
(hab)2
r2rϕ
)K2,k 3r∏
j=1,j 6=k
Γ(K2,j−K2,k)
p∏
j=n+1
Γ(K1,j−K2,k)
.
In the following, we derive the closed-form expressions of asymptotic H11, H12, H13, H21,
H22, H23, and ̺, respectively.
A. Derivation of H∞1
Substituting (8), (33), and (35) into H11 and using (3.351.1) of [33], we have results in the
following
H∞11 =
∫ Θ−1
0
∫ x
0
FγRE (y) f
∞
γRD
(y) dyf∞γSR (x) dx
=
IφτDD
ΩτDRDτD!
3r∑
k=1
χk
Ω
K2,k
RD
∫ Θ−1
0
xK2,k+τD−1dx
− Iφ
τD
D
ΩτDRDΓ (τD)
3r∑
k=1
χk
Ω
K2,k
RD
τE−1∑
n=0
λnE
n!
Γ (τD + n)
λτDE + n
×
∫ Θ−1
0
xK2,k−1
(
1− e−λEx
τD+n−1∑
q=0
λ
q
Ex
q
q!
)
dx
=
IφτDD
ΩτDRDτD!
3r∑
k=1
χk(Θ− 1)K2,k+τD
Ω
K2,k
RD (K2,k + τD)
− Iφ
τD
D
ΩτDRDΓ (τD)
3r∑
k=1
χk
Ω
K2,k
RD
τE−1∑
n=0
Γ (τD + n)
n!λτDE
×
(
(Θ− 1)K2,k
K2,k
−
τD+n−1∑
q=0
λ
q
EΥ (K2,k + q, λE (Θ− 1))
q!λ
K2,k+q
E
)
.
(36)
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Similarly, we can have
H∞12 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) f
∞
γRD
(y) dyf∞γSR (x) dx
=
∫ ∞
Θ−1
f∞γSR (x) dx
(
F∞γRD (Θ− 1)−
φτDD
ΩτDD Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
λnE
n!
∫ Θ−1
0
yτD+n−1e−λEydy
)
=
(
1− F∞γSR (Θ− 1)
)(
F∞γRD (Θ− 1)−
φτDD
ΩτDD Γ (τD)
τE−1∑
n=0
Υ (τD + n, λE (Θ− 1))
n!λτDE
)
.
(37)
H∞13 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ x
Θ−1
φ3 (y) f
∞
γRD
(y) dyf∞γSR (x) dx
= e−λE(
1−Θ
Θ )
τE−1∑
n=0
n∑
q=0
λnE(1−Θ)n−q
Θnq! (n− q)! ψ1
(
q,
λE
Θ
)
−
τE−1∑
n=0
λnE
n!
ψ1 (n, λE),
(38)
where ψ1 (c1, c2) =
∫∞
Θ−1
∫ x
Θ−1 y
c1e−c2yf∞γRD (y) dyf
∞
γSR
(x) dx.
By using (3.326.2), (3.351.2), and (8.352.6) of [33], we obtain
ψ1 (c1, c2) =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ x
Θ−1
yc1e−c2yf∞γRD (y) dyf
∞
γSR
(x) dx
=
φτDD Γ (τD + c1)
cτD+c12 Ω
τD
RDΓ (τD)
(
1− F∞γSR (Θ− 1)− I
τD+c1−1∑
n=0
3r∑
k=1
χkΓ (K2,k + n, c2 (Θ− 1))
n!Ω
K2,k
RD c
K2,k
2
)
− φ
τD
D Υ (τD + c1, c2 (Θ− 1))
cτD+c12 Ω
τD
RDΓ (τD)
(
1− F∞γSR (Θ− 1)
)
.
(39)
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B. Derivation of H∞2
By substituting (8), (33), and (35) intoH21 and using (50) of Appendix A, and (07.34.21.0084.01)
of [39], we obtain
H∞21 =
∫ Θ−1
0
∫ x
0
FγRE (y) f
∞
γSR
(y) dyf∞γRD (x) dx
=
∫ Θ−1
0
F∞γSR (x) f
∞
γRD
(x) dx
− I
3r∑
k=1
χk
Ω
K2,k
RD
τE−1∑
n=0
1
n!λ
K2,k
E
∫ Θ−1
0
Υ (K2,k + n, λEx) f
∞
γRD
(x) dx
=
IφτDD
ΩτDRDΓ (τD)
3r∑
k=1
χk
K2,kΩ
K2,k
RD
∫ Θ−1
0
xK2,k+τD−1dx
− Iφ
τD
D
ΩτDRDΓ (τD)
3r∑
k=1
τE−1∑
n=0
χk
n!Ω
K2,k
RD λ
K2,k
E
∫ Θ−1
0
Υ (K2,k + n, λEx) x
τD−1dx
=
IφτDD
ΩτDRDΓ (τD)
3r∑
k=1
χk(Θ− 1)K2,k+τD
K2,kΩ
K2,k
RD (K2,k + τD)
− (Θ− 1)
τDIφτDD
ΩτDRDΓ (τD)
3r∑
k=1
τE−1∑
n=0
χk
Ω
K2,k
RD n!λ
K2,k
E
G
1,2
2,3
[
λE (Θ− 1)
∣∣∣1−τD ,1K2,k+n,0,−τD
]
.
(40)
Similarly, we have
H∞22 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) f
∞
γSR
(y) dyf∞γRD (x) dx
=
∫ ∞
Θ−1
f∞γRD (x) dx
∫ Θ−1
0
FγRE (y) f
∞
γSR
(y)dy
=
(
1− F∞γRD (Θ− 1)
)(
F∞γSR (Θ− 1)− I
τE−1∑
n=0
3r∑
k=1
χkΥ (K2,k + n, λE (Θ− 1))
n!Ω
K2,k
RD λE
K2,k
)
.
(41)
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By adopting (8), (27), (32), and (35), and after some algebraic manipulations, we obtain
H∞23 =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
(
1− F∞γRD (y)
)
φ3 (y) f
∞
γSR
(y)dy
= e−λE(
1−Θ
Θ )
τE−1∑
n=0
n∑
q=0
λnE(1−Θ)n−q
Θnq! (n− q)!
×
(
ψ2
(
q,
λE
Θ
)
− φ
τD
D
ΩτDRDτD!
ψ2
(
τD + q,
λE
Θ
))
+
τE−1∑
n=0
λnE
n!
(
φτDD
ΩτDRDτD!
ψ2 (τD + n, λE)− ψ2 (n, λE)
)
,
(42)
where ψ2 (c1, c2) =
∫∞
Θ−1 γ
c1e−c2yf∞γSR (y) dy.
By placing f∞γSR (y) into ψ2 (c1, c2) and using (3.351.2) of [33], one can have
ψ2 (c1, c2) =
∫ ∞
Θ−1
γc1e−c2yf∞γSR (y)dy
= I
3r∑
k=1
χk
Ω
K2,k
RD
∫ ∞
Θ−1
yK2,k+c1−1e−c2ydy
= I
3r∑
k=1
χkΓ (K2,k + c1, c2 (Θ− 1))
Ω
K2,k
RD c
K2,k+c1
2
,
(43)
where Γ (·, ·) is the upper incomplete Gamma function, defined by (8.350.2) of [33].
C. Derivation of ̺∞
The asymptotic CDF of γeq,D can be expressed as [14]
F∞γeq,D (x) =
φτDD x
τD
ΩτDRDτD!
+ I
3r∑
k=1
χkx
K2,k
K2,kΩ
K2,k
RD
− Iφ
τD
D
ΩτDRDτD!
3r∑
k=1
χkx
K2,k+τD
K2,kΩ
K2,k
RD
. (44)
By substituting (7) and (44) into (31) and using (3.326.2) of [33], it deduces
̺∞ = 1− φ
τD
D Γ (τE + τD)
ΩτDRDτD!Γ (τE) λE
τD
− Iλ
τE
E
Γ (τE)
3r∑
k=1
χkΓ (K2,k + τE)
K2,kΩ
K2,k
RD λE
K2,k+τE
+
IφτDD
ΩτDRDτD!Γ (τE)
3r∑
k=1
χkΓ (K2,k + τD + τE)
K2,kΩ
K2,k
RD λE
K2,k+τD
.
(45)
The SDO is expressed as [34]
Gd = − lim
ΩRD→∞
lnP∞out
ln ΩRD
, (46)
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where P∞out denotes the asymptotic SOP.
Observing the aforementioned results, we find that H∞12 , H
∞
13 , H
∞
22 , H
∞
23 , and ̺
∞ are the
dominant terms for SDO in the higher SNR region. We can then easily achieve secrecy diversity
order as
Gd = min
{
τD,
ξ2
r
,
a
r
,
b
r
}
. (47)
Remark 5: From (47), one can observe that the SDO depends on the fading parameter of
the R-D link (mD), the number of the antennas at D (ND), the fading parameters (a, b), the
detection type (r), and the pointing error parameter (ξ) of the FSO link.
Remark 6: When mD or/and ND increase, which means the SNR at D increases, the SDO
will become better, which can be easily understandable.
Remark 7: For large ξ or/and (a, b), the SDO will get better since the SNR at R get better.
This can be explained by the results in [21]. With the same reason, the SDO with HD (r = 1)
is outperforms that of IM/DD (r = 2).
Remark 8: An interesting result can be reached from (47) that the SDO of mixed RF-FSO
systems is independent of the parameter of EH (α), the path-loss exponent (η), the fading
parameter of the eavesdropping channels (mE), and the number of antennas at E (NE).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we represent our results with figures to better clarify the SOP of the DL mixed
RF-FSO SWIPT systems. Additionally, we analyze the impacts of the following parameters on the
security of DL mixed RF-FSO systems: the number of the antennas at the legitimate destination,
fading parameter of RF and FSO links, pointing error, and type of detection. In these figures,
we set N0 = σ
2
D = σ
2
E = 1, Pt = 30 dBm, dD = dE = 10 m, Lc = 3.597 × 10−2, NE = 2,
αD = αE = α, mD = mE = m, and Rs = 0.01 nat/s/Hz.
Figs. 2 - 5 show the SOP versus ΩSR for different values of r, ξ, ND, η, and α. These figures
clearly show that the secrecy performance is enhanced with increasing ΩSR, as the SNR at the
relay node is improved. By varying r and keeping ξ fixed in Fig. 2, the HD detection method
can lead to better secrecy performance than IM/DD method. Moreover, the SOP with lower ξ
is higher than that with larger ξ. The reason for this is that the SNR obtained with the HD
method is higher than that of IM/DD, and a larger ξ means higher pointing accuracy. Finally,
SOP exhibits a floor because the secrecy capacity will become a constant, as testified in [21].
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Fig. 2. SOP versus ΩSR with ND = 3, η = 3.0, m = 2, a = 2.902, b = 2.51, α = 0.5, ΩRD = 5dB, and ΩRE = 0dB.
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Fig. 3. SOP versus ΩSR with ND = 3, m = 2, r = 1, ξ = 1.1, α = 0.5, ΩRD = 5dB, and ΩRE = 0dB.
As shown in Figs. 3 and 4, the SOPs with lower η or higher α values outperform those with
higher η or lower α value in higher ΩSR regions. This is because a lower η represents a weaker
path-loss for the RF signals, and a higher α means more power is allocated to decoding the
information, resulting in a higher power at target destinations.
Fig. 5 represents the SOP for different values (a, b) and ND. We can see that a larger ND will
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10-1
Fig. 4. SOP versus ΩSR with ND = 3, m = 2, η = 3.0, r = 1, ξ = 1.1, ΩRD = 5dB, and ΩRE = 0dB.
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Fig. 5. SOP versus ΩSR with m = 2, η = 3.0, r = 1, ξ = 1.1, α = 0.5, ΩRD = 5dB, and ΩRE = 0dB.
result in a smaller SOP, meaning better secrecy performance, since a larger ND leads to more
diversity gains. One can also see that the SOP with the weak turbulence (a = 2.902, b = 2.510)
is lower than that with strong turbulence (a = 2.064, b = 1.342). The reason is the same as that
for the previous findings in Fig. 2.
For the results presented in Figs. 6-9, we set ϕ = 1. In this figures, we see that the asymptotic
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Fig. 6. SOP versus ΩRD with ND = 1, η = 3.0, r = 1, ξ = 1.1, α = 0.5, and ΩRE = 3dB.
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Fig. 7. SOP versus ΩRD with m = 1, η = 3.0, r = 1, ξ = 1.1, α = 0.5, and ΩRE = 3dB.
SOP tightly approximates the exact results at high-ΩRD regime. Additionally, the SDO is subject
to the fading parameters of the RF link (Fig. 6), the number of the antennas at D (Fig. 7),
the fading parameters of FSO link (Figs. 6-9), the pointing errors (Fig. 8), and the detection
technology (Fig. 8). These results are in agreement with those obtained using (44).
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Fig. 8. SOP versus ΩRD with ND = 3, m = 2, η = 3.0, NE = 2, r = 1, α = 0.5, and ΩRE = 3dB.
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Fig. 9. SOP versus ΩRD with ND = 3, m = 2, η = 3.0, ξ = 1.1, α = 0.5, and ΩRE = 3dB.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we analyzed the secrecy performance of DL mixed RF-FSO SWIPT systems and
derived the closed-form expressions for the exact and asymptotic SOPs. Simulation and numerical
results show that the HD detection method can lead to better secrecy performance compared to
IM/DD method. The fading parameter of relay-destination link, the number of the destination’s
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antennas, the fading parameters, the detection type, and the pointing error parameter of the FSO
link will influence the SDO of DL mixed RF-FSO SWIPT systems. Our results can be used in
practical mixed RF-FSO systems design, in which security issue is considered. The interesting
topic for future work is investigating the secrecy performance of the mixed RF-FSO systems
with multiple relays (such as relay selection) and multiple users (such as user scheduling) and
design the cooperative jamming scheme with artificial noise to improve the secrecy performance
of mixed RF- FSO systems.
APPENDIX A
Using (8.352.1) of [33], we rewrite G0 (α, β) as
G0 (α, β) =
∫ Θ−1
0
Υ (α, βx) fγSR (x) dx
= AΓ (α)
∫ Θ−1
0
x−1
(
1− e−βx
α−1∑
t=0
βtxt
t!
)
G
3,0
1,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
= AΓ (α)
∫ Θ−1
0
x−1G3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
−AΓ (α)
α−1∑
t=0
βt
t!
∫ Θ−1
0
xt−1 exp (−βx)G3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
= AΓ (α)
(
G1 (0, 0)−
α−1∑
t=0
βtG1 (t, β)
t!
)
,
(48)
where G1 (z1, z2) =
∫ Θ−1
0
xz1−1e−z2xG3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx.
Then utilizing e−x =
∞∑
s=0
(−x)s
s!
and (07.34.21.0084.01) of [39], we obtain 2
G1 (z1, z2) =
∫ Θ−1
0
xz1−1e−z2xG3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
=
∞∑
s=0
(−z2)s
s!
∫ Θ−1
0
xz1+s−1G3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
= Ξ
∞∑
s=0
(−z2)s(Θ− 1)z1+s
s!
G
3r,1
r+1,3r+1
[
Br (Θ− 1)
r2r
∣∣∣1−z1−s,K1K2,−z1−s
]
,
(49)
where Ξ = r
a+b−1
(2pi)r−1
.
2Note that the infinity summation is using here, but it converges quickly, which is verified by simulation results in Section V
and many literatures, such as [44], [45].
June 7, 2018 DRAFT
24
APPENDIX B
By using (9) of [43], (8.311.1), and (9.31.5) of [33], we have
Υ (a, z) = G1,11,2
[
z
∣∣1
a,0
]
. (50)
And by using (21) in [42], we finally obtain
G2 (α, β) = A
∫ ∞
Θ−1
x−1Υ (α, βx)G3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
= A
∫ ∞
0
x−1G1,11,2
[
βx
∣∣1
α,0
]
G
3,0
1,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
− A
∫ Θ−1
0
x−1Υ (α, βx)G3,01,3
[
Bx
1
r
∣∣∣ξ2+1ξ2,a,b] dx
= AΞG3r+1,1r+2,3r+1
[
Br
r2rβ
∣∣∣1−α,1,K1K2,0
]
−AG0 (α, β) .
(51)
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